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TRADE REGULATION: DISTRICT COURT CLARIFIES
TEST FOR CONGLOMERATE MERGER VIOLATION OF
CLAYTON ACT
In a divestiture suit under the Clayton Act, the Southern District
of New York linited the investigation necessary to ascertain a sec-
tion 7 violation on the basis of reciprocity and brought reciprocal
dealing standing apart from an acquisition within the purview
of section 1 of the Sherman Act by analogy to tying arrangements.
The reasoning and conclusions of the court may give significant im-
petus to the reciprocity concept as a basis for antitrust regulation
with important implications for business expansion by diversifica-
tion acquisition.
THE APPLICATION of antitrust legislation to reciprocal buying, or
the practice of preferring one's customers when purchases are made,1
was a dormant issue for over thirty years2 until its recent emergence
1 Reciprocal buying may be more specifically defined as a business practice whereby
"one firm buys from another with the explicit or tacit understanding that the other
firm will buy from it in return." Note, 49 VA. L. Rv. 852 n.2 (1963). Reciprocity,
in the general sense, is a pervasive and widely accepted business practice, reportedly
affecting all sales in some industries. See Handler, Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciproc-
ity, Diversification and Joint Ventures, 49 VA. L. REy. 433, 435-36 (1963).
Commentators and the courts have generally delineated four types of reciprocal
dealing. Leverage, or coercive, reciprocity, whereby A buys from B only on the
condition that B buy from A's new division (see note 8 infra and accompanying text)
is but one of these. Related to leverage reciprocity is "secondary reciprocity" whereby
A and B have merged and A could, through purchasing power, force its vendor,
C, to force in return its vendor, D, to 'purchase from B. See United States v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963). See generally Harvith, Reciprocity
and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 40 WVAsH. L. REy. 133, 178 (1965); Note, 32 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 832, 833 (1964). On the other hand, mutual, or "consensual," reciprocity refers
to the practice by which two firms simply agree, without the use of leverage by either
party, to purchase from one another. See notes 44, 56-63 infra and accompanying
text. A second type of non-coercive reciprocity is "accommodative" or "'psychological"
reciprocity whereby a company buys without any agreement or other overt expression
of its purpose but in the hope merely of currying favor so that the vendor will buy
from it in return. See Day, Conglomerate Mergers and the "Curse of Bigness," 42
N.C.L. RFv. 511, 530 (1964); Krash, The Legality of Reciprocity Under 7, 9 AnT-Rusr
BULL. 93, 99 (1964) ; see note 84 infra.
See generally Austin, A Survey of the Problems Encountered in Combating Re-
ciprocal Trading Under Existing Trade Regulation. Laws, 41 IND. L.J. 165, 167-70
(1966); Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 552, 566-67 (1965); Harslia, The Conglomerate Merger and
Reciprocity-Condemned by Conjectures?, 9 ANiITRUST BULL. 201, 208 (1964).
2 Reciprocity involving the coercive use of mirket power was first held illegal over
thirty years ago by the FTC as an unfair method of competition under § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
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as a subject of growing concern among both courts3 and com-
mentators. 4 Revitalization of the reciprocity concept was given
renewed impetus by FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,5 wherein the
Supreme Court held that section 7 of the Clayton Act proscribes
conglomerate mergers7 which may enable the acquiring company
to use its purchasing power to compel its vendors to initiate-or
California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937); Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C. 67
(1932); Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931). See generally Marshall, Reciprocity
as an Emerging Issue, 29 A.B.A. ANTITRUsr SEcnoN 195, 196 (1965). The question of
the legality of reciprocity did not arise again until recent years. See note 3 infra.
Reciprocity has recently been the significant issue in the decision of three prior
cases, FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963); and United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 242
F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965). Reciprocity is also the basis of the Government's allega-
tions in a pending suit, United States General Motors Corp., TRADE REG. REP.
45,063 (Case 1733) (N.D. Ill. 1963). Moreover, reciprocity has been mentioned in the
Government's or enforcement agency's allegations in at least two other cases: United
States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 217 F. Supp. 110, 126 (D. Del. 1963), vacated and
remanded, 378 U.S. 158 (1964), dismissed, 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965) (joint ven-
ture) Procter & Gamble Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16673 (FTC
1963), remanded for dismissal, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4329
(U.S. April 11, 1967).
'E.g., Asper, Reciprocity, Purchasing Power and Competition, 48 MINN. L. REv. 523
(1964); Austin, supra note 1; Handler, Gilding the Philosophic Pill-Trading Bows for
Arrows, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 1 (1966); Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust
Laws, 77 HARv. L. REv. 873 (1964); Krash, supra note 1; Note, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
832 (1964); Note, 49 VA. L. REv. 852 (1963);, Note, 1 VALPARAISO L. REv. 114 (1966);
Comment, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 739 (1965).
- 380 U.S. 592 (1965), reversing 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.), reversing 62 F.T.C. -
(1963), 20 Sw. L.J. 192 (1966), 44 TxAs L. REv. 1019 (1966). See generally United
States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965); Handler, Eighteenth
Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 20 REcoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 540, 557 (1965);
The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56, 181-85 (1965).
6 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). Section 7 provides in
relevant part as follows: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corpo-
ration subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lesssen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
"A conglomerate merger is, theoretically, a merger of companies which are not re-
lated as suppliers, customers, or competitors; that is, mergers "in which there is no
discernible relationship in the nature of business between the acquiring and acquired
firms." Jacobs, Mergers and the Small Business Man, 16 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 83,
84 (1960). See H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949). Actually, the term
is a residual one, denoting mergers which are neither horizontal (between conipanies
producing the same or similar products) nor vertical (between a company andone of
its suppliers or customers) and includes a wide variety of acquisitions ranging from the
true conglomerate to those which more nearly resemble horizontal or vertical relation-
ships. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L.
REv. 1313, 1315 (1965). See, e.g., Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics and
Law, 46 GEo. L.J. 672 (1958).
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increase purchases from the acquired company.8 In United States
v. General Dynamics Corp.,9 the District Court for the Southern
District of New York expanded the scope of reciprocal practices
proscribed by section 7 and detailed the process by which illegal
reciprocity effects arising from a merger are to be identified. More-
over, the court held that reciprocity is within the ambit of section 1
of the Sherman Act.10
General Dynamics, one of the nation's largest industrial enter-
prises, merged with Liquid Carbonic, the largest domestic producer
of carbon dioxide in an oligopolistic industry in which it accounted
for approximately thirty-five per cent of the market.11 At the time
of the acquisition, General Dynamics possessed extensive purchasing
power by virtue of its annual purchases totaling over 500 million
dollars.12 Because many of its suppliers were also purchasers of
carbon dioxide,13 General Dynamics developed a "Special Sales Pro-
gram" through which it was suggested to the major suppliers that
their sales might be reduced unless they agreed to make reciprocal
purchases of carbon dioxide;14 the program successfully procured sales
for Liquid Carbonic.' 5 The district court ordered divestiture, con-
cluding that the conglomerate merger violated section 7 since it
created leverage power in General Dynamics which would result in
coercive reciprocity likely to foreclose Liquid Carbonic's competitors
from a substantial share of the carbon dioxide market.', With regard
to section 1 of the Sherman Act, the court dismissed allegations that
contracts arising out of the Special Sales Program constituted an
unreasonable restraint of trade.' 7 Nevertheless, the court found that
since both companies intended at the time of the merger to engage in
8 For a discussion of reciprocity with particular reference to Consolidated Foods, see
Asper, supra note 4, at 524-25; Hausman, supra note 4, at 873; Comment, 11 WAYNE L.
REv. 739, 780 (1965).
9258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
'0 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). The statute provides in rele-
vant part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con.
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States ... is declared to be
illegal .... "
1' 258 F. Supp. at 39.
12 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
14 Id. at 42.15 Id. at 48.
"Id. at 62-65. See notes 71-79 infra and accompanying text.
17258 F. Supp. at 66. See notes 105-17 infra and accompanying text.
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reciprocal dealing, the merger itself was an illegal combination with-
in the proscription of section 1.18
The original prohibition upon reciprocal dealing was promul-
gated during the 1930s in three decisions 9 which concerned the
application of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.20 Each
of these cases involved highly abusive and coercive use of the ac-
quirer's dominant purchasing position to increase a subsidiary's sales
volume.21 Following these decisions, however, reciprocity disap-
peared as a major concern from the antitrust arena until the advent
of Consolidated Foods. There, the FTC utilized the amended
section 7 of the Clayton Act rather than section 5 of the FTC Act,
apparently because the latter provision, offering a cease and desist
order as the only remedial device, was insufficient to attack the basic
cause of reciprocity, which was deemed to be the corporate acquisition
itself.22
SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Since the amendment of section 7 in 1950,23 the Clayton Act
has applied to all categories of mergers, including conglomerates.
24
Is 258 F. Supp. at 67. See notes 119-20 infra and accompanying text.
10 See note 2 supra.
2038 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
21 In Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931), Armour Co., a major meat packer,
used its position as a major shipper to force the railroads to buy from the gear manu-
facturer, Waugh, which it had acquired. The subsidiary's share of the market in-
creased from less than one to thirty-five per cent in six years. Similarly, in Mechanical
Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932), Swift & Co., also a major meat packer, used its power as a
shipper to force purchases by the railroads from its gear manufacturer. In California
Packing Co., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937), a major food processor compelled its suppliers to route
their products through a shipping terminal which the food processor owned.
22 See Consolidated Foods Corp., [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
16182, at 20973 (FTC 1962); Note, 32 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 832, 849-50 (1964).
23 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914). See note 6 supra.
24 Prior to 1950, § 7 was a relatively infrequent source for antitrust litigation because
of a twofold limitation: (1) the provision was worded so as to apply only to mergers by
stock acquisition. Thus, "almost every company with legal advice took the asset route
in making acquisitions." Turner, supra note 7, at 1314; (2) the section was gen-
erally considered applicable only to horizontal mergers. Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 313 (1962); United States v. E. I. duPont & Co., 353 US. 586, 613-15
(1957) (dissenting opinion).
Congressional concern over the trend towards economic concentration, facilitated
by the narrow construction of § 7 and reinforced by a desire to formulate antitrust
provisions applicable to mergers beyond those reached by *§ 1 of the Sherman Act,
culminated in the 1950 amendment of § 7, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950). ATr'y GEN. NAT'L
CoMm. ANTITRUST REP. 117 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Arr'y GEN. REP.]. See United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
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• Despite a clear expression of legislative intent,25 however, controversy
over the applicability of the modified section to conglomerate acqui-
sitions26 ceased only after dictum in Brown Shoe v. United States27
listed such combinations as fully within the section's scope.28 In
Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court concluded from an examination of
States, supra at 315. Thus, the amendment was designed to cover acquisitions by
assets as well as by stock and was intended to make clear that § 7 applied to "all types
of mergers and acquisitions, vertical and conglomerate as well as horizontal .... H.R.
REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949). See Note, 10 Vim. L. REV. 734, 754-55
(1965). Furthermore, the amended section was to apply before the effects of a merger
warrantid invocation of the Sherman Act and the determinative standard utilized was
to be more stringent than that under the Sherman Act. S. REP'. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 4-5 (1950). See H.R. REP..No. 1191, supra at 7-8. Thus, the words "may be substan-
tially to lessen competition" were added to illustrate that the emphasis was to be on
the probability of anticompetitive effects and not on the actual results of the merger.
S. REP. No. 1775, supra at 4-6; Ar'y GEN. REP. 118.
Congress articulated no specific standards to determine a violation of the section
although the factors to be considered included whether the competitive role of any of
the market's substantial members had been ended; whether the relative size of the
acquirer was such that ithad a decisively definite advantage over its competitors; and
whether the number of competitors who would be eliminated from competition was
significant. H.R. REP. No. 1191, supra at 8. Furthermore, Congress imposed no
standards to delineate the relevant market and did not adopt "a definition of the word
'substantially' . . . by which a merger's effects on competition were to be measured.
While providing no definite quantitative or qualitative tests by which enforcement
agencies could gauge the effects of a given merger... Congress indicated plainly that
a merger had to be functionally viewed, 'in the context of its particular industry."
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra at 320-22.
Apparently Congress intended merely to prescribe a broadly defined test, thereby
enabling the courts to evaluate the probable effects of each merger without the restric-
tion of a rigidly defined standard. See Harvith, supra note 1, at 167 & n.117.
See generally H.R. REP. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); S. REP. No. 1775,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); Hrusoff, Conglomerate Mergers, Joint Ventures, Market Ex-
tensions and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 69 DicK. L. REV. 113-18 (1965); Note, 52
CoLum. L. REv. 766 (1952); Note, 10 Vim. L. REV, 734 (1965).
25 H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949). See note 24 supra.
20 It was suggested that Congress had never intended conglomerates to be included
within § 7 because'they could not injure competition and because Congress did not
understand the nature of "true" conglomerates and thus did not intend to reach them,
Addresses by M. A. Adelman and Robert A. Bicks, Meeting of the Antitrust Section of
the Association of .the Bar of the City of New York, Nov. 13, 1956, cited in Blair, supra
note 7, at 673-74 nn.9-10. See Harvith, supra note 1, at 169-70; Note, 49 VA. L. REv. 852,
853-54 (1963).
'1 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
28 Id. at 317 & n.31. Brown Shoe Co. was a leading manufacturer of shoes and the
third largest domestic shoe vendor, controlling over 845 retail outlets. Id. at 301. The
acquired company, G. R. Kenney Co., was the eighth largest seller of shoes and controlled
over 400 retail outlets. Id. at 303. As both Brown and Kenney were distributors
and Brown was a manufacturer, the merger had both horizontal and vertical aspects.
Id. at 323-36. The Court concluded that the result of the vertical integration would
be a lessening of competition, id. at 334, and that the horizontal merger would fore-
close competitors from five per cent of the market, id. at 343-46, and therefore held both
aspects violative of § 7.
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congressional intent that a merger must be "functionally viewed,"2 9
in light of all relevant evidence of the economic and competitive
structure in which it was to take place, in order to ascertain its
probable effects upon competition." Thus, judicial inquiry was not
to be limited merely to consideration of the amount of competition
likely to be foreclosed as evidenced by the projected post-merger
market shares.3 1 However, the amended section was to prevent only
29 Id. at 321-22. See note 24 supra.
0 0 Thus, the Brown Shoe Court refused to adopt the "quantitative substantiality"
doctrine which was enunciated in Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293
(1949), an action under § 3 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1964). In that case, the Supreme Court concluded that the exclusive supply agree-
ments which Standard Oil had with independent service station operators foreclosed a
substantial share of commerce in the relevant product line since almost sixteen per cent
of the retail gasoline dealers in the area had entered into the exclusive arrangements.
This foreclosure percentage was held sufficient to demonstrate a violation of § 3 and
therefore further examination of the agreements' probable anticompetitive effects was
deemed unnecessary. It may be noted that § 3 prohibits certain leases, sales, or con-
tracts of sale where the effect thereof "may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." Because of the similarity between
this language and that of § 7, see note 6 supra, it had been argued that the relatively
simple "quantitative substantiality" test, relying primarily upon market shares, should
be applied to the amended § 7 as well. See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the
Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HAiv. L. REv. 226, 249, 256 (1960).
8 1 The Supreme Court interpreted the considerations articulated by Congress, see
note 24 supra, as reflecting "a conscious avoidance of exclusively mathematical tests."
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321 n.36 (1962). Moreover, although
market shares are "the primary index of market power," id. at 322 n.38, and "one of
the most important factors to be considered," id. at 343, "the percentage of the market
foreclosed .. . cannot itself be decisive." Id. at 329. Thus, the Court noted that
"only a further examination of the particular market-its structure, history and prob-
able future-can provide the appropriate setting for judging the probable anti-
competitive effect of the merger." Id. at 322 n.38. Factors to be weighed include
the degree of fragmentation or concentration of the industry; recent trends towards
domination of the industry; the ease of access of buyers and sellers to each other
within the market or the extent of foreclosure therein; and the ease and probability
of entry by new competitors. Id. at 322. See Handler, Fifteenth Annual Review of
Antitrust Developments, 17 RacoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 433 (1962); Rahl, Current
Antitrust Developments in the Merger Field, 8 ANnTRUsT BULL. 493, 505-10 (1963);
Note, 10 ViLL. L. Rv. 734, 776-82 (1965).
It is arguable, however, that in spite of its theoretical rejection of a market share
test the Supreme Court actually placed heavy reliance on that factor at least in de-
termining the invalidity of the horizontal aspect of the merger. In concluding this
aspect violative of § 7, the Court stated: "The market share which companies may
control by merger is one of the most important factors to be considered when deter-
mining the probable effects . ..on .. . competition . . . . If a merger achieving
5% control were now approved, we might be required to approve future merger efforts
by Brown's competitors seeking similar market shares. The oligopoly Congress sought
to avoid would then be furthered .... ." 370 U.S. at 343-44. The Court then em-
phasized that this share would be held by a large national company, a circumstance
which increased the likelihood of resulting anticompetitive effects. Id. at 244. After
thus stressing market shares, the Court considered one further factor furnishing
Vol. 1967: 388]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
those mergers with "demonstrable anticompetitive effects. '3 2  The
provision was not directed at those mergers which improved the com-
petitive position of small companies or mergers intended to save a
failing firm.33
Subsequently, however, in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. United
States,34 the Supreme Court refused to rule that every merger must
be subjected to the extensive factual inquiry directed by Brown Shoe.
Rather, the Court, emphasizing the necessity and utility of devising a
simpler test by which economic inquiry could be limited within
workable bounds, 35 held that where the relative size of the merger
qualified it as "inherently suspect," elaborate analysis of market
characteristics may be eliminated.386 Thus, the Court established
"additional supporf," namely, the structure of the industry and the growing concen-
tration therein. Id. at 343-44. Thus, .two aspects received consideration, but it seems
apparent that the market share element was the predominant consideration.32 Id. at 319.
38E.g., H.R. RFx. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6-8 (1949) (small companies); S.
EP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1950) (failing firms).
85374 U.S. 321 (1963). Philadelphia' National Bank and Girard Trust Corn Ex-
change Bank, the second and third largest respectively of the commercial banks in the
Philadelphia metropolitan area, planned a merger which would have resulted in
the largest bank in the area with approximately 34% of the net loans, 36% of the
total assets, and 36% of the iggregate deposits. The new bank, together with the then
second largest, would have controlled 59% of total assets, 58% of net loans, and 58%
of all deposits. Moreover, the four largest banks would then have had 78% of the
net loans, 78% of total assets, and 77% of all deposits. Id. at 331.
35'The Supreme Court expressed its concern with the need for a more limited
test by referring to the complexity and elusiveness of economic data, the need for
guidelines by which businessmen could assess the legal consequences of mergers, and the
danger of subverting legislative intent by allowing "too broad" an economic inquiry
and concluded that "in any case in which it is possible . .. to simplify the test of
illegality, the courts ought-to do so in the interest of . . . judicial administration."
374 U.S. at 362. In support of its argument, the Court cited Bok, supra note 80.
See Turner, supra note 7, at 1315-94.
86 374 U.S. at 363. "[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue per-
centage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concen-
tration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially
that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger
is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects .... Such a test lightens the burden
[of proof] only with respect to mergers whose size makes them inherently suspect ...."
Ibid. Although the Court stated that it was following the directives of Brown Shoe, id.
at 355, the more limited inquiry in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, and in its sequel, United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 577 U.S. 271 (1964), represents a departure from
the broad factual approach of Brown Shoe in order to avoid the danger of becoming
involved in a "too-broad economic investigation." 374 U.S. at 362. However, this
approach is not entirely inconsistent with Brown Shoe, for it represents the delineation
of specific circumstances under which the broader factual analysis may be confined
where such an analysis would occupy a court beyond the necessity for deciding the
case at hand. Note, 10 ViLL. L. R1v. 754, 789 (1965). See generally Comment, 11
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market shares and foreclosure percentages as the sole determinants
of a section 7 violation when a horizontal merger would greatly in-
crease the concentration of an already oligopolistic industryYt
In FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., the Supreme Court for the
first time invalidated a conglomerate merger under section 7 solely
on the basis of its resultant potentiality for reciprocity.3, Consoli-
dated Foods, a large distributor of food products, acquired Gentry,
Inc., a manufacturer of dehydrated garlic and onion, which together
with another producer controlled ninety per cent of the relevant
WAYNE L. Rxv. 739, 743, 770 (1965). Thus, where a merger both significantly in-
creases the market's concentration and places an "undue percentage" of the market
in the hands of one company, "elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior,
or probable anticompetitive effects" may be dispensed with and a presumption that
anticompetitive effects will follow arises. 374 US. at 363; Asper, supra note 4, at 544.
The courts have not clearly defined the point at which the share of the market to be
held by the impending merger becomes "undue." See Merger Developments in the
Supreme Court, A Panel Discussion, 26 A.BA. ANrrmusr SEToN 233, 236 (1964).
However, in light of the wide variance between the foreclosure percentages found
violative in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank (30%) and Aluminum Co. of America (1.3%), it
seems apparent that this figure will depend to some extent on an economic analysis of
the market and heavily upon the degree of concentration disclosed. See 377 U.S. at
280-81.
37 374 U.S. at 362-67.
38 The first actual application of the amended § 7 to invalidate an apparent con-
glomerate merger and. the first thorough discussion of the problems involved in such
an application was undertaken in Procter & Gamble Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. 16673 (FTC 1963), remanded for dismissal, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir.
1966), rev'd 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4329 (U.S. April 11, 1967). In that case, which arose be-
fore Consolidated Foods, the FTC attacked a merger through use of the "deep pocket"
test utilized in Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See Donnem,
Conglomerate Mergers and Reciprocity, 8 ANrTTRUSr BULL. 283, 285-86 (1963). The
"deep pocket" test is based on the presumption that the competitive advantage given
to the acquired company by the wealth of its parent and the structure of the market is
likely to result in the suppression of competition. See Note, 25 U. Pr-r. L. REv. 683,
700 (1964); Note, 49 VA. L. REv. 852, 854-61 (1963).
Reynolds concentrated on the advantage given by the larger company's wealth in
waging price wars in the context of a vertical merger. In Procter & Gamble, the FTC
adopted the test as applicable to conglomerate mergers and emphasized, in addition to
the size of the acquirer, the broader spectrum of advantages in such areas as advertising
and marketing which would accrue to the acquired company. See Procter & Gamble
Co., [19 63-1 9 65 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16673, at 21580 (FTC 1963). See
generally Donnelly, The Supreme Court, The Federal Trade Commission and the
Not-So-Conglomerate Merger, 43 U. DEr. L.J. 35, 36-41 (1965).
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Commission's decision on the ground that
"the Supreme Court has not ruled, that bigness is unlawful, or that a large company
may not merge with a smaller one in a different market field. Yet the size of Procter
... seems to be the motivating factor which influenced the Commission . 3..." 58 F.2d
at 84. The Sixth Circuit thus attacked the fundamental basis of the "deep pocket"
theory, the simple fact of relative size. Unimpressed by this objection, the Supreme
Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and substantially affirmed the FTC's approach as a
valid test of § 7 violations. See 35 U.S.L. WEE.a at 4329.
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market.39 After characterizing reciprocity as an "anticompetitive
practice," 40 the Supreme Court suggested that, since many of
Consolidated's suppliers bought Gentry's products, Consolidated's
purchasing strength gave it leverage power to coerce its suppliers
into buying from Gentry and concluded that such practices would
result in a substantial lessening of competition. 41 However, the
Court's approach was not clearly defined. Concentrating upon ques-
tions of fact, the Court based its decision primarily upon the oli-
gopolistic nature of the garlic and onion industry, Consolidated's
purchasing power, and the actual increase in Gentry's market shares.
In doing so, it is apparent that while the Court did not apply a test
as simple as that employed in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, neither did it
engage in a full economic analysis of all relevant factors.4
2
Assuming the anticompetitive character of coercive reciprocity
to be settled by Consolidated Foods, the district court in General
Dynamics drew upon a dictum in that opinion43 to conclude that
" 380 U.S. at 596,
40 Id. at 594. Mr. Justice Douglas prefaced the body of the majority opinion by
stating: "We hold at the outset that the 'reciprocity' made possible by such an acqui-
sition is one of the congeries of anticompetitive practices at which the antitrust laws are
aimed. The practice results in 'an irrelevant and alien factor' . . . intruding into the
choice among competing products, creating at least.'a priority on the business at equal
prices.'" Ibid.
"See id. at 596-600.
.,2 Although there was no question of the concentrated nature of the industry, the
Court did not consider certain other factors which arguably would seem pertinent
under a Brown Shoe analysis: (1) whether Gentry's market share increase was due to
the production of an improved product or to more intense competition, see id. at
603-04 (Stewart, J., concurring); (2) whetier the economics of the market actually
gave Consolidated the leverage power assumed to be present, see Turner, supra note 7,
at 1393; (3) the ease of access to the market by suppliers and access to suppliers by
buyers; (4) the. extent to which there had actually been foreclosure; (5) whether new
competitors were barred from entering the market in light of the fact that at the
time of the Commission's decision a new firm had entered the market, 380 U.S. at
605 (Stewart, J., concurring). See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
322 (1962).
"3 258 F. Supp. at 58. The aspect of the Consolidated Foods opinion which the
district court interpreted as indicating a proscription of mutual reciprocity was the
following textual statement: "Reciprocal trading may ensue not from bludgeoning or
coercion but from more subtle arrangements. A threatened withdrawal of orders if
products of an affiliate cease being bought, as well as a conditioning of future pur-
chases on the receipt of orders for products of the affiliate, is an anticompetitive
practice." 380 U.S. at 594. Arguably, this statement does not involve mutual reciprocity
at all but concerns different ways in which reciprocity may be coerced. Recognizing that
the passage "certainly does not require the conclusion that mutual patronage reciprocity
is within the ambit of the anti-trust laws," the district court relied on a footnote to the
above statement. 258 F. Supp. at 58. The footnote in question quotes Edwards, Con-
glomerate Mergers as a Source of Power, in NATIONAL BuREAu OF EcONOMic RFSEARCH,
BusiNEss CONCENTELAIION AND PRICE PoLIcy 331, 342 (1955). to the effect that mutual
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mutual reciprocity, whereby companies freely agree to reciprocate, 44
is similarly anticompetitive. 4 5  Nevertheless, in considering the
alleged violation of section 7, the court purported to limit its dis-
cussion to the potential for coercive reciprocity and the probable
effects thereof.46
In determining whether sufficient leverage power was present
to constitute a threat to competition, General Dynamics employed
a more mechanical approach than that of Consolidated Foods. In
the latter case, leverage power was assumed from the nature of the
acquirer's purchasing strength and the fact that the acquirer's vendors
also bought the products of the acquired company.47 General Dy-
namics, however, concluded that where a supplier sells more to the
acquirer than he purchases from the acquired company a "pre-
dictable threat to competition is presented." 48  On the other hand,
those suppliers who purchase nearly as much or more than they sell
to the acquirer are automatically excluded from those upon whom
coercive reciprocity may be practiced. 49
It may be seriously questioned, however, whether such a test in
fact indicates the presence of actual coercive power.50 Arguably, in
buying agreements prevent competitors from selling to either company and afford
both companies the advantages of an assured place as a supplier. 380 U.S. at 594 n.2.
" See note 1 supra.
"The thrust of the district court's conclusion is summarized as follows: "[T]he
actual or potential implementation of coercive reciprocity, which presupposes the
existence of leverage, is inimical to a competitive economic society. 'Mutual patronage'
reciprocity, on the other hand, occurs when both parties stand on equal footing with
reference to purchasing power... yet agree to purchase from one another. While the
former practice certainly is the more offensive, the latter arrangements are equally dis-
ruptive of the competitive processes." 258 F. Supp. at 59.
"4 Id. at 61.
47 See 380 U.S. at 595; Austin, supra note 1, at 179.
to 258 F. Supp. at 61.
40 The district court stated: "If the [sales differential] figures approach equipoise,
the only reciprocity approach possible is one of mutual patronage." Ibid.
60 It may be noted, however, that the recent cases, including General Dynamics,
may arguably be interpreted to necessitate only a showing that a particular merger
would create a circumstance which might produce anticompetitive effects. In other
words, precise economic analysis is largely unimportant since the question is merely
whether that potentially anticompetitive situation will be allowed to come into ex-
istence. Essentially, a burden is placed on the merging parties .to demonstrate that they
deserve the privilege to merge rather than on the Government to establish that they
should be denied the right to do so. In this context, then, a test such as the one
laid down in General Dynamics may be acceptable to the extent it does reveal situa-
tions in which reciprocity may operate. The test's imprecision may be ignored in the
absence of evidence that the prediction of anticompetiveness is inaccurate. See United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,
880 U.S. 592 (1965).
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order for potential coercive reciprocity to exist, the acquirer's vendors
must sell a significant portion of their output to the acquirer in
order to create a relationship of economic dependency so that de-
creases in purchases by the acquirer would force a reaction.5 ' In
this light, it would seem that by failing to consider the degree to
which the acquirer's vendors depend upon the acquirer's purchases,
General Dynamics overlooked a necessary step in accurate analysis
by assuming coercive power on the basis of sales differentials alone.
Moreover, if economic dependence is the accurate determinant, not
only may there be no actual leverage power with reference to some
companies within the class bearing gross sales differntials, but lever-
age might in fact be successfully exerted against some of those corpo-
rations arbitrarily excluded.52
On the other hand, General Dynamics, following Consolidated
Foods,53 buttressed its assumption that coercive power was present
by reference to post-acquisition evidence of actual reciprocal prac-
tice.54 Thus, because a company which practices coercive reciprocity
necessarily had a pre-existing capacity to do so, post-acquisition evi-
r1 See, e.g., STOCKING, WORuKABLE COMPETITION AND ANTITRusr PoLIcY 291-92 (1961);
Krash, supra note 1, at 98; Turner, supra note 7, at 1387-88.
In its defense, General Dynamics relied upon the theory that effective leverage power
depends primarily on the degree to which the acquirer's suppliers depend on the
acquirer for sales. Thus, the company argued that since its "purchases from sig-
nificant users of carbon dioxide . . . represent such an insignificant portion of the
total sales of these suppliers it could not have any leverage .... Defendant's Memo-
randum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, p. 74, United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 246 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Turner makes a similar argument with reference to Consolidated Foods: "Con-
solidated's testimony that it was pointless to exert pressure on national suppliers is
more than plausible. To refuse to carry national brands that command widespread
consumer acceptance would probably cost Consolidated far more money ...than it
would gain from ... greatly increased sales of onion and garlic; and national suppliers,
knowing this, could safely assume that Consolidated would not alter its own pur-
chasing decisions on the basis of whether its suppliers purchased from Gentry." Turner,
supra note 7, at 1393.
2 For example, as in the case of Transitron Electronics: the supplier's total sales
approximated 48 million dollars; its sales to the acquirer, General Dynamics, were
approximately 500 thousand dollars; and its purchases from the acquired company
were only 31,000 dollars. The court noted that "no meaningful unilateral threat, express
or implied, could be made to Transitron to require that company to purchase the
products of liquid Carbonic." 258 F. Supp. at 51. On the other hand, even where the
supplier purchases more than he sells, if what he does sell is a significant portion of
his total production, it may be plausibly argued that threats to reduce those sales would
at least operate to maintain the level of the supplier's purchases.
380 U.S. at 598.
,258 F. Supp. at 63. See note 82 infra and accompanying text.
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dence validated the result reached by the court. 55 However, in the
absence of such after-the-fact validation, the precision of the sales
differential criterion to infer potentiality for coercive reciprocity is
open to question. Arguably, however, the inaccuracy of the court's
test may be mitigated if utilized to indicate the potential for mutual,
in addition to coercive, reciprocity. Gross sales differential might
indicate a likelihood of mutual reciprocity agreements to "lock in"
or increase existing sales.56 Even though the supplier may not be
susceptible to coercion, he may favor reciprocity as a means to prevent
any diminution in his present sales. Since both forms of reciprocity
may be illegal, if the test is interpreted to encompass both practices,
it no longer need accurately reflect actual coercive power.
Moreover, the court does in fact give practical effect, albeit sub
silentio, to its purportedly only theoretical proscription of acquisi-
tions which give rise to a potential for mutual reciprocity. The
percentage of market foreclosure upon which the court relies to de-
termine that the potential for coercive reciprocity constituted a
violation of section 757 represented the fraction of total industry
sales of carbon dioxide made by'Liquid Carbonic through the Special
Sales Program. 58 As such, this figure includes sales which resulted
from both mutual and coercive reciprocity. 59 In light of this un-
articulated reliance upon mutual reciprocity, the court's leverage
test may be legitimized since the "leverage" disclosed includes both
the power to coerce and to induce reciprocity.
The district court rested its proscription of acquisitions giving
" Another ground on which the court's test might be justified is that General
Dynamics purchased from over 80,000 suppliers, of which approximately 75% were
present or potential buyers of one or more of Liquid Carbonic's products. 258 F.
Supp. at 39. Since § 7 is concerned merely with probabilities (see note 24 supra),
arguably, it may be reasonable to presume that some members of this aggregate would
be susceptible to coercion since many of them buy less from Liquid Carbonic than
they sell to General Dynamics. Thus, even though the potential for coercion has not
been specifically identified, it may be plausible to assume that a threat to competition
exists. However, while a threat might be presumed, there would still be no indica-
tion that the threat is significant or that competition may be substantially affected.
6 258 F. Supp. at 60.
6 See note 74 infra and accompanying text.
M 258 F. Supp. at 64.
' The court separately identified certain mutual agreements which arose under the
Special Sales Program. See id. at 59. As the foreclosure figure represents all sales
made to companies encompassed by that Program and those made through coercive
reciprocity are at no time separated, the figure by definition includes both forms of
reciprocity. See notes 74-79 infra and accompanying text.
Vol. 1967: 388]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
rise to mutual reciprocity on the notion that mutual and coercive
reciprocity produce similar effects.°0 This identification, however,
disregards the qualitative difference between the two forms: the exis-
tence of coercion. The equation is defensible to the extent that the
manner in which market foreclosure arises does little to alter its effect.
Nevertheless, it is arguable that the two forms of reciprocity should
be distinguished in applying section 7. Coercive reciprocity mani-
fests an additional anticompetitive aspect beyond mere foreclosure by
forcing the customer to buy from a supplier other than the one which
he may have chosen voluntarily. It thus seems reasonable that a
merger evincing a clear probability of such abusive practices should
fall within the ambit of section 7. Assuming an equally clear prob-
ability of mutual reciprocity, it appears less justifiable to proscribe
a merger merely on the basis of actual or potential mutual agreements
since their anticompetitive effects cannot be so automatically pre-
dicted. Mutual reciprocity may encompass a broad spectrum of
bilateral transactions: 61 it may involve an exchange of products to
enable each company to compete more effectively in its own market; 62
the transaction may be a simple barter arrangement; 3 or it may be
devoid of leverage and result in little or no foreclosure.0 4 Moreover,
such arrangements may quickly fall to improvements in price, quality,
'or service on the part of competitors.0 5 The court itself, however,
60 See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
61 See Handler, Gilding the Philosophic Pill-Trading Bows for Arrows, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1966).
02 See Note, I VALPARAiso.L. Rxv. 114, 128-37 ,(1966). See also Hausman, Reciprocal
Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HAav. L. Rv. 873-81 (1964).
63 See Handler, Gilding the Philosophic Pill-Trading Bows for Arrows, 66 CoLuM.
L. Rav. 1, 6 (1966); Hausman, supra note 62, at 881.
e4See Handler, Gilding the Philosophic Pill-Trading Bows for Arrows, 66 CoLUbt.
L. PEv. 1, 6-8 (1966); cf. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers And Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 78 HARv. L. Ray. 1313, 1389-90 (1965).
Or Of course, the effects of competitive inducements are limited to the extent that
the supplier is unwilling to forego the acquirer's less attractive terms in order to avoid
any risk of losing his profit margin on sales to the acquirer. Nevertheless, where the
supplier reciprocates out of economic convenience rather than economic compulsion,
the agreement may remain palatable to him only when he suffers no deficiency in the
product or services he receives. Furthermore, an arguable basis for applying a blanket
proscription upon mergers which may give rise to coercive reciprocity is the fact that
it is unilaterally self-perpetuating. An equally stringent prohibition open mergers in-
volving mutual reciprocity seems inapt, for the practice requires the continued rapport
of two parties, either of whom may freely terminate the association. It does not seem
compelling that a merger should be invalidated because (1) there may be a potential
for mutual agreements; (2) such do result and (3) they may restrict competition when
[V/ol. 1967:3888
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provides the most telling argument for according separate treatment:
"[I]t borders on the impossible to anticipate the number and scope
of mutual arrangements that will [result from] . . . a conglomerate
merger."66  Short of assuming that all conglomerate mergers will
result in mutual reciprocity, it seems unreasonable to impose di-
vestiture on the basis of a mere possibility except where, as in the
instant case, post-acquisition evidence proves both existence and
effect. Thus, as it is inaccurate to categorize all mutual reciprocity
as anticompetitive and because prediction of its existence is at best
speculative, it seems proper to require proof of a clear likelihood or
actual evidence that substantially anticompetitive mutual reciprocity
has occurred or will ensue.67
After assuming the presence of coercive power on the basis of
sales differentials, General Dynamics presumed that where leverage
power exists, its implementation will follow and that, in any event,
"the public would best be served by eliminating the temptation." 68
With any intermediate question as to the actual use of reciprocal
power ignored, 69 the only consideration remaining once leverage
has been ascertained is whether its effects may be sufficiently anti-
(a) they may never come into being; (b) those which do evolve may be of that type
which carries no anticompetitive consequence and (c) any that do result may fall
rapidly to new counteractive vigor on the part of competitors.
" 258 F. Supp. at 60. The district court continued: "Viewed as of the time of the
merger . . . there being no dominating spur to this type of reciprocity, its future
presence or absence is difficult to gauge . . . . The results of leverage reciprocity on
competition are far more subject to prognosis than . . mutual patronage reciprocity."
Ibid. Compare note 80 infra and accompanying text.
67 The potential for mutual reciprocity alone does not give rise to a likely repre-
hensible effect, namely coercion, and thus the inquiry in merger litigation where
mutual reciprocity is the issue should comport with the basic standard of § 7: whether
competition in a relevant line of commerce is likely to be lessened substantially. The
potential for mutual reciprocity without more provides at the very most an unsatis-
factory answer to this question. See Handler, Gilding the Philosophic Pill-Trading
Bows for Arrows, 66 COLUmn. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1966).
The proof required for invalidation of a merger on the basis of mutual reciprocity
would preferably take the form of post-acquisition evidence of the actual practice and
its effects. Where such evidence was unavailable, perhaps some type of "predisposition"
approach could be utilized whereby a violation would be established through evidence
of repeated previous antitrust violations, intent to engage in the reciprocal practice, or
a high incidence of reciprocal dealings in the market of the acquirer, the acquired, or
both.
"8 258 F. Supp. at 62.
"0 Contra, United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518, 524-25 (D.N.J.
1965). In that case, the court held that the question of substantiality became relevant
only after it was determined that leverage power would probably be used. See note 70
infra.
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competitive to bring the merger within the prohibition of sec-
tion 770
Consolidated Foods provided no clear test to determine when
competition is substantially lessened within the meaning of sec-
tion 7.71 General Dynamics, on the other hand, defined a simplified
test to be applied by utilizing market shares and foreclosure per-
centages as the determinative criteriaP2 In contrast to the detailed
economic investigation manifested by Brown Shoe,73 the court based
its conclusion squarely on its finding that the reciprocity program
resulted in a foreclosure of Liquid Carbonic's competitors from a
five per cent share of the carbon dioxide market.74 In so restricting
the scope of the analytic inquiry, the court relied upon the necessity
of preventing further concentration in oligopolistic industries as ex-
pressed in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank75 and its progeny76 and the simple
7o Section 7 of the Clayton Act reads "where... the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition ...... 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1964). See generally Consolidated Foods Corp. v. FTC, 380 U.S. 594 (1965); 39
ST. JOHN'S L. R~v. 343, 352 (1965). In United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., supra
note 69, at 525, however, the court explicitly rejected any strict or absolute approach
to deal with the problem of reciprocity. In that case, the acquiring company, Reynolds
Tobacco, had not previously engaged in reciprocity and argued that company policy
would prevent such practices in the future. In light of this consideration and in
the absence of any convincining indication that reciprocity would be practiced, the
district court expressly refused to assume that leverage would be used and declined
to enjoin the merger. See generally Day & Bodner, Developments in Antitrust During
the Past Year, 28 A.B.A. ANTrrRusr SEcTION 7, 52 (1965).
It should also be noted, however, that the broad language of the court in General
Dynamics may be limited by its reference, ostensibly for purposes of substantiation,
to previous antitrust violations by Liquid Carbonic and General Dynamics and to post-
acquisition evidence that leverage had in fact been used. 258 F. Supp. at 62-63.
'z See note 42 supra and accompanying text. See generally Harvith, Reciprocity
and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 40 WAsH. L. Rav. 133, 171-74 (1965). One com-
mentator argues that,' since conglomerate mergers present new and'unfamiliar prob-
lems, the Supreme Court purposely refrained from presenting precise standards in
Consolidated Foods-so as to allow flexibility in the development of an applicable
prospective standard. Donnelly, supra note 38, at 78.
'! See 258 F. Supp. at 63-65.
7' See notes 29-33 supra and accompanying text.
q' 258 F. Supp. at 63-65; see note 58 supra and accompanying text.
7 See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
In Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, the Supreme Court concluded that the thrust of § 7
was the the prevention of concentration and remarked as follows: "[I]f concentration is
already grear; .the importance of preventing even slight increases in concentration...
is correspondingly great." 374 U.S. at 365 n.42. The district court in General Dynamics
relied both on this^ footnote and upon the sequel decision to Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (see note 36 supra
and accompanying text). 258 F. Supp. at 65.
In Alcoa, the Court considered a merger between Alcoa and Rome Cable Corp.
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foreclosure test promulgated therein3 7  Concluding that the pre-
merger character of the carbon dioxide industry was excessively
concentrated and that the five per cent foreclosure was "more than
the 'slight increase' condemned by dictum in Philadelphia National
Bank)" the court held that the section 7 violation was established.78
Thus adopting both the test and underlying philosophy of Phila-
delphia Nat'l Bank, General Dynamics went beyond the ambivalence
of Consolidated Foods to establish that the detailed analysis of Brown
Shoe may also be unnecessary in considering the probable effects of
reciprocity in a conglomerate acquisition. 9
It may be questioned, however, whether the foreclosure test
should be uniformly applied to conglomerate mergers. When em-
ployed to determine the effects of horizontal mergers, such a test
has much to recommend it. In that situationit places workable limi-
tations on the extent to which an economic analysis is required in a
category of mergers where the effects on competition are made
reasonably apparent merely by adding the market shares of the
merging competitors.80 However, as no competitor is removed from
the market by a conglomerate acquisition, the foreclosure effects of
when Alcoa held 27.8% of the aluminum conductor market and Rome 1.3%. 377 U.S.
at 278. The industry was oligopolistic in nature with Alcoa and another company
accounting for 50% of the market and nine producers accounting for 95.7%. Ibid.
Relying expressly on the above footnote in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, the Court con-
cluded that the 1.3% foreclosure or increase in concentration which would result
from the removal of Rome from the market through the merger constituted a viola-
tion of § 7. Id. at 279.
" See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
78 258 F. Supp. at 65. The court also supported its conclusion by noting that the
5% foreclosure in the instant case was at least three times the 1.3% condemned by
the holding in Alcoa (see note 76 supra). 258 F. Supp. at 65.
7 An attempt to develop a more limited test for application to conglomerate
mergers, involving aspects of both Brown Shoe and Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, is found
in Procter & Gamble Co., [1963-1 9 65 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16673 (FTC
1963) (see note 38 supra). Rather than expressly apply such a test to a conglomerate,
however, the Commission labored to classify the merger between Procter and Clorox
as belonging in a subcategory of horizontal and vertical mergers. See Donnelly,
supra note 38, at 39-45, 55-57; Comment, 6 B.C. IND. & Comm. L. REv. 254, 260-71
(1964).
For analysis of the difficulties involved in an overly complex economic inquiry
and for an argument in favor of more limited standards for all mergers, see generally
Bok, supra note 30, at 258-350; Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U.
PA. L. REv. 176 (1955); Turner, supra note 64, at 1318-86.
80 See United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
rev'd on other grounds, 378 U.S. 441 (1964); Asper, Recipocity, Purchasing Power
and Competition, 48 MSNN. L. REv. 523, 544 (1965); Day, Conglomerate Mergers and
the "Curse of Bigness," 42 N.C.L. REv. 511, 525 (1964); Donnelly, supra note 38, at
57. Cf. Turner, supra note 64, at 1389.
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such a merger are not so immediately nor accurately predictable.81
Thus, use of the limited test in considering the effects of reciprocity
upon such an acquisition would seem proper only where, as in
General Dynamics, brief "functional" analysis has revealed a con-
centrated market and the court is able to base its "predictions" of
market foreclosure on post-merger evidence82 of resulting market
Il It has been argued that a strict percentage foreclosure test is inapposite when
dealing with conglomerate mergers since "unlike the vertical and horizontal mergers,
the conglomerate merger does not automatically eliminate competition in a certain per-
centage of the market.... [A] simple percentage test cannot be constructed where there
is a conglomerate merger. No competition existed between the two firms before the
merger... One cannot say that the merger will increase the acquired firm's share of
the market by a certain fixed percentage." Donnelly, supra note 38, at 57-58. See United
States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd on other
grounds, 378 U.S. 441 (1964) ("such tests are particularly inapposite where a conglom-
erate merger is under scrutiny"); KAYsztN & TuRNER, ANTITRUsr PoLicy, AN ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL ANAYsis 131 (1959); Jacobs, Mergers and the Small Business Man, 16 A.B.A.
ANTrTrusT SECTION 83, 85 (1960); Turner, supra note 64, at 1315-16.
11 The district court's reliance on post-acquisition evidence is revealing in light of
the Supreme Court's admonition in Consolidated Foods that such evidence is not
to be given conclusive weight. 380 U.S. at 598. Accord, Ecko Prods. Co. v. FTC,
347 F.2d 745, 751 (7th Cir. 1965). The Seventh Circuit, in reversing the FTC, had
stated that "probability can best be gauged by what the past has taught." Consoli-
dated Foods Corp. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1964). The court of appeals had
then concluded on the basis of ten years of post-acquisition evidence that the merger
in question did not violate § 7 because Consolidated's attempts to utilize its buying power
to influence sales had had little effect and no substantial impact upon competition. In
reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court ruled that the Seventh Circuit
had not erred in considering post-acquisition evidence but had been incorrect in
giving it conclusive weight. The Court's decision is couched in negative terms, how-
ever, and offers no explicit instruction as to the proper weight to be accorded post.
acquisition evidence. Moreover, two members of the Court themselves differed as to
the proper disposition of the issue. To Mr, Justice Stewart, "probabilities" should be
determined on the basis of post-acquisition evidence because it is the most accurate
determinant of anticompetitive effects, 380 U.S. at 605-06 (concurring opinion), and
Mr. Justice Harlan implied that the actual results of the merger should control, id.
at 601-02 (concurring opinion).
In effect, however, the majority's opinion in Consolidated Foods seems to indicate
that post-acquisition evidence may be used affirmatively to support a conclusion of
illegality but that it may not be equally used negatively to override "probabilities"
and illustrate the illusory nature of a merger's predicted effects. See Harvith, supra
note 71, at 175. Arguably, this interpretation is substantiated not only by Consolidated
Foods but also by General Dynamics willingness to rely heavily on post-acquisition
evidence.
Re-emphasizing that the "force of § 7 is still in probabilities," 880 U.S. at 598, the
Supreme Court reasoned that according conclusive weight to such evidence would
be to confer a "free trial period" upon a company with reciprocity potential and
would encourage "acquisitions [to] ... go forward willy-nilly, the parties biding their
time until reciprocity was allowed fully to bloom." Ibid. Arguably, however, these
considerations should not prevent the conclusive use, affirmatively or negatively, of
post-acquisition evidence in all situations. Since suit may be brought under §7
whenever the merger gives rise to a probability of anticompetitive effects, United States
v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597-98 (1957), and the effects of the
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shares.8 3
By presuming that gross differentials in sales and purchases give
rise to leverage power in the acquirer and that such leverage will
always be used, General Dynamics in effect promulgates a condition-
ally "per se" rule for application to conglomerate mergers under
section 7: where the opportunity for reciprocity exists, the result of
which may be a substantial lessening of competition, a violation of
section 7 is adjudged. Especially as to mutual reciprocity, it is ques-
tionable whether the probability for reciprocal activity can be
accurately gauged.84 With regard to both forms, the effect on future
conglomerate mergers is at least to make them hazardous and appre-
hensive adventures. The court's statement that the "mere presence
of reciprocity power . . . alone indicates the need for divestiture"8' 5
implies that the only legal conglomerates may be those in which the
acquired company is wholly unrelated to the acquirer with no inter-
action among the buyers and sellers of each. The fact that this type
of diversification may also be the least advantageous economically
and the least supportable on principles of sound business manage-
ment seems now an unimportant consideration.86
acquisition are to be measured at the time of the suit rather than at the time of the
merger, United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 168 (1961), it seems
doubtful that many merged corporations would initiate reciprocity after a long period
of joint operation. Not only would the initiation of such activity immediately expose
the merged company to liability under § 7, but the prospect of litigation is likely to be
especially distasteful after a long period of consolidation in light of the prohibitively
high cost of divestiture. Moreover, allowing post-acquisition evidence to establish
or to disprove the substantiality of the competitive effect would yield advantages
both to the courts and to businessmen by simplifying the task of applying § 7. At the
same time, some of the apprehension facing a company upon a decision to merge
may be dispelled by the knowledge that it will be able to disprove predicted illegality.
83 However, where the merger has not taken place and no evidence of actual effects
is available, a reasonably valid prediction of probable effects would seem to require
a more detailed economic inquiry similar to that advised by Brown Shoe. See notes
29-33 supra and accompanying text.
8 See notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text. It is also arguable that the
difficulties in ascertaining and proving the potential for mutual reciprocity mean that
the test would not be enforced on a strict probability basis. The strict enforcement of
such a policy arguably would require the virtual elimination of conglomerate mergers
between companies of large size with mutual customers or suppliers. See Asper, supra
note 80, at 554-55; Handler, Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification
and Joint Ventures, 49 VA. L. Rxv. 433, 439-40 (1963). To one commentator, "it
would be preposterous to outlaw a merger simply on the grounds that the merged
firm would have a greater ability [to join in agreements which would restrain
trade] .... " Turner, supra note 64, at 1389.
85 258 F. Supp. at 67.
80 Moreover, in light of the present restraints upon horizontal mergers (see United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
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The broad implications of the opinion may, however, be limited
by the circumstances in which the case arose. Like Consolidated
Foods, 7 General Dynamics represents the intrusion of a large com-
pany with extensive purchasing power into an oligopolistic market.
Moreover, to a greater degree than in Consolidated Foods, there was
extensive post-acquisition evidence of actual reciprocal dealing.
Nevertheless, although a lessening of competition would seem most
likely where an oligopolistic industry is involved, no such qualifica-
tion on the scope of the proscription presented in General Dynamics
is expressed or inferable from the opinion.88
America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964)) and vertical mergers (see United States v. Jos. Schlitz
Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 385 U.S. 37 (1966); United States v.
Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), 253 F. Supp. 196 (D.N.J. 1966); United States v. Yellow
Cab. Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947)), and the evolving restrictions on conglomerates, as exem-
plified by the instant case, disposition of assets to a buyer who can gain from the trans-
action becomes an increasingly difficult endeavor.
8TSee notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text.
88 Purely as dictum, the district court intimated that acquisitions giving rise to
"accommodative" reciprocity, where the seller patronizes his buyer through a totally
independent and unilateral action merely in the hope that the buyer will reciprocate,
may constitute a violation of § 7. 258 F. Supp. at 66. While the application of § 7 to
mutual and coercive reciprocity may be justifiable on the basis of resultant effects,
the inclusion of the accommodative variation seems unwarranted. It is difficult
accurately to label such transactions as reciprocal in any form since the seller's purchase
from the acquired company is a purely voluntary act, the purpose of which is un-
communicated to the acquirer. See, e.g., Handler, Gilding the Philosophic Pill-
Trading Bows for Arrows, 66 CoLuas. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1966). Whatever "foreclosure"
results is only that which ensues from the making of any purchase; at the moment of
consummation all other competitors are foreclosed from making that sale. Where
sellers voluntarily favor the conglomerate, in the words of Professor Turner, "it would
be wholly unreasonable, even if possible, to prohibit such behavior; it can be eliminated
only by forestalling the creation of the conglomerate structure that fosters it." Turner,
supra note 64, at 1390. While this of course presents the optimum course for pre-
vention of these practices, a policy of outlawing this form of business expansion and
diversification merely because it may result in "accommodative reciprocity" seems
questionable. This conclusion is based upon the considerations that "accommodative
reciprocity" may affect an insubstantial part of the market, have no forelcosure effect,
fall easily to better price or service elsewhere, and be easily separable from the more
justifiedly prevented practices of mutual and coercive reciprocity. Thus, such an
expansion of the reciprocity doctrine under § 7 has been opposed by many of the
commentators. See, e.g., Handler, Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversifica-
tion and Joint Ventures, 49 VA. L. REV. 433, 436-37 (1963); Handler, Gilding the
Philosophic Pill-Trading Bows for Arrows, 66 CoLums. L. Rav. 1, 6 (1965); Harsha, The
Conglomerate Merger and Reciprocity-Condemned by Conjecture?, 9 ANTIRhUST BULL.
201, 208-10 (1964); Hausman, supra note 62, at 881.
It may perhaps be arguable that the Supreme Court offered an unarticulated
proscription of acquisitions promoting accommodative reciprocity by quoting as follows
from the FTC opinion in Consolidated Foods: "[M]erely as a result of its connection
with Consolidated, and without any action on the latter's part, Gentry would have an
unfair advantage over competitors enabling it to make sales that otherwise might not
have been made." 380 U.S. at 597. However, as both the language and reasoning of
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SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
Section I of the Sherman Act provides that agreements in restraint
of trade are illegal.8 9 Thus both business contracts"° and mergers91
are encompassed within the section's proscription. In General
Dynamics, the Government's allegations that contracts arising out
Consolidated Foods went to the issue of coercive reciprocity, this veiled reference to the
characteristics of accommodative reciprocity seems to be little more than dictum.
The most direct application of § 7 to accommodative reciprocity is found in United
States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963), which arose before the decision
in Consolidated Foods. There the Third Circuit affirmed the issuance of an injunc-
tion under § 7 to bar Ingersoll-Rand, a large designer and manufacturer of industrial
machinery, from merging with three manufacturers of underground mining equipment.
Concluding that "the public interest required the interlocutory relief granted by the
court below," id. at 525, the court based its decision on the grounds that Ingersoll-
Rand would possess thirty per cent of the underground mining equipment and ma-
chinery market; that it would "be in a favorable position to finance extended operations
should it seek to ... enlarge its nascent capabilities of engrossing the market"; and that
it would be able to further dominate the market by offering a complete line of equip-
ment and by extending consumer financing through its wholly owned finance company.
Id. at 524. Finally, the court of appeals quoted from the court below as follows:
"[Tihe judicious use of its steel-purchasing power by Ingersoll-Rand could . .. in-
crease the sales by the acquired companies . .. to the coal mining companies which
acutely need the continued good will of tie steel industry. Moreover, the mere existence
of this... power might make its conscious employment toward this end unnecessary; the
possession of the power is frequently sufficient, as sophisticated businessmen are quick
to see the advantages in securing the good will of the possessor.... [Tihe advantages
... from so favoring the acquired companies would not have to be pointed out by
Ingersoll-Rand." Ibid. While this "three-cornered" reciprocity was certainly not the
only basis for the decision, the language of the court may be read to imply that con-
glomerates creating reciprocity power "should be barred ab initio." See Harvith, supra
note 71, at 177-79. However, the accuracy of this contention may be doubted since it
is arguable that the merger was not of the conglomerate type but rather a combination
of competitors. See United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817, 822 (N.D. Cal.
1963).
so 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). The statute reads: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations is declared to be
illegal." Section 1 initially applied to proscribe any contract in restraint of trade.
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 341 (1897). Recognizing
the stringency of such an application, the Supreme Court later adopted a "rule of
reason" which proscribed only those contracts which unreasonably restrained trade.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,60 (1911). However, certain practices
such as price fixing and tying arrangements have been designated unlawful per se on
the theory that they are so inherently harmful to the competitive system that they
are not reasonable in any form. E.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S.
392 (1947); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). See ATT'y GEN. REP. 1-100;
Schwartz, A Law Professor's View of the Sherman Act-Fluid Fronts in the War Against
Excessive Concentration of Economic Power, 27 A.B.A. ANTIThuST SEcrON 87 (1965).
9 0 E.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Timken Roller Bearing Co.
v. United States, 341 U.S. 539 (1951).
01 E.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
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of the reciprocity program and the merger itself were in violation of
section 1 presented questions of first impression.2
In order to provide guidelines for applying section 1 to contracts
based on reciprocity and to establish such agreements as within the
scope of that proscription, General Dynamics analogized both co-
ercive and mutual reciprocity to tying arrangements.08 The Supreme
Court has viewed "tie-ins" as per se unlawful because they deny
competitors access to the market of the tied product and represent the
use of economic power in one market to restrain competition in
another.94 Viewing reciprocity is analogous to such tying practices
92See notes 18-22 supra and accompanying text. However, the applicability of
§ 1 to reciprocity had been raised in passing during argument before the Supreme
Court in Consolidated Foods. Counsel for Consolidated Foods conceded that red-
procity might violate § 1. 33 U.S.L. WaaK 3302 (U.S. March 16, 1965). On the other
hand, the Solicitor General curiously took the position that reciprocal buying, standing
alone, is not subject to the proscription of § 1:
"Mr. Cox: If it used the power of reciprocial buying, or perhaps if it attempted to
use it, then there would be a case under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act .... I think it would be under that.., rather than Section 1 of the Sherman
Act ....
"JUSTICE WHITE: And, query, would there be a Section 1 case?
"Mr. Cox: I think we would have a Section 5 case ....
"JUSTICE WHITE: I understand that. But I am asking about Section 1.
"Mr. Cox: I think that it would be Section 7 of the Clayton Act that we would
use if anything.
"JUSTICE WHITE: You would probably lose ....
"JUSTICE WHITE: You are just suggesting effective reciprocity as such, it is not
a violation of anything except perhaps Section 5.
"Mr. Cox: Yes...." Transcript of Argument, FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,
pp. 76-77, quoted in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 50-
51, United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 246 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
93 258 F. Supp. at 66. A tying arrangement is "an agreement by a party to sell one
product [the tying product] but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases
a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product
from any other supplier." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
See generally Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J.
19 (1957); Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws,
72 HARv. L. REv. 50 (1958).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-46 (1962); Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953); Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v.
United States, 37 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); Burrus, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity:
A Lawyer's Comment on Professor Ferguson's Analysis, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 581
(1965); Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 80
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 55Z (1965).
Tying arrangements are violative of both § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the
Clayton Act. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, supra at 608-09. How-
ever, it has been questioned whether § 3 applies to reciprocity, since that provision bars
sales to which certain conditions are attached, whereas in reciprocal dealing the condi-
tion is attached to the purchases made from the supplier. See Harvith, supra note 71, at
165-67; Hausman, supra note 62, at 884. Contra, Note, 32 GEO. WASH. L. R v. 832, 853
(1964).
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since both involve the transfer of economic power with a resultant
restraint upon competition, the court adopted the Supreme Court's
standard that tie-ins are unlawful per se if "a not insubstantial
amount of commerce is affected" as determinative of the legality of
reciprocal agreements.9 5
In general, the tie-in analogy seems appropriate in the case of
coercive reciprocity. A fundamental basis for imposing conditionally
per se illegality upon tie-ins is that they involve the coercive use of
economic power to obtain sales.96 The mechanics are the same with
respect to coercive reciprocity, and both tie-ins and coercive reci-
procity further result in market foreclosure.9 7 As there is little
evident virtue in, either practice, it seems reasonable to accord
coercive reciprocity the same unsympathetic treatment given tie-ins
under the Sherman Act.98
On the other hand, the rules of tying arrangements seem to
provide a less compelling and instructive analogy to mutual reci-
procity. The court justified the analogy by emphasizing the simi-
larity in effects between tie-ins and reciprocity.99 However, mutual
reciprocity may not always produce, in fact, an anticompetitive effect,
at least to the extent that it represents an exchange of products to
1 258 F. Supp. at 66-67.
05 E.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-17 (1958); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594, 605, 611 (1953); Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,
305-06 (1949); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); United States
v. Jerrold Electronics Co., 187 F. Supp. 545, 555 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (dictum), aff'd per curi-
am, 965 U.S. 567 (1961); Handler, Eighteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments,
20 REcoRD op N.Y.C.B.A. 540, 544 (1965); Singer, Market Power and Tying Arrange-
ments, 8 Atrna=usr BULL. 653, 657-60 (1963); Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrange-
ments Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HIv. L. Rv. 50, 60-62 (1958).
07 Both tying and coercive reciprocity encompass two anti-competitive aspects: (1) an
unwilling buyer or seller is forced to make a purchase which he otherwise might not
have made; (2) this process results in a foreclosure of competition and a restraint
of trade. See Handler, Gilding the Philosophic Pill-Trading Bows for Arrows, 66
CoLuM. L. RaV. 1, 5-6 (1966); Hausman, supra note 62, at 881-82.
'8 See Handler, Gilding the Philosophic Pill-Trading Bows for Arrows, 66 CoLum.
L. REv. 1, 3-8 (1966); Hausman, supra note 62, at 880.
'0 After acknowledging that the tie-in analogy may not be equally applicable to
mutual reciprocity, the court concluded in the following manner: "If anti-trust legisla-
tion were designed primarily to insulate customers from abuse, the 'tying-in' analogy
would be without merit with reference to noncoercive reciprocity. However, this is
not the case. The legislation is intended to preserve free competition. Reciprocity,
whether mutual or coercive, serves to exclude competitors by the exercise of large
scale purchasing power. This court concludes that the analogy . . . applies to both
forms of reciprocity." 258 F. Supp. at 66.
Vol. 1967: 388]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
enhance competition or a barter arrangement. 00 Moreover, in em-
phasizing effects the court disregards the substantive difference in
means. Since a primary basis for the imposition of a per se rule
upon tie-ins is the use of leverage power,' 0 ' arguably that rule depends
both upon the effects of the arrangement and upon the means utilized
to achieve those effects. By definition, however, mutual reciprocity
does not involve the coercive use of leverage; rather the purchase is
voluntarily made.10 2 Where the purchase is freely negotiated, no
tie-in exists 03 and as the tying rule is inapplicable in the absence of
coercion, it seems inappropriately applied to mutual reciprocity.
Thus, because the analogy between tying arrangements and mutual
reciprocity is imprecise and because the latter practice may not
always give rise to anticompetitive results, a flexible rule of reason
would seem to be more suitably applied to situations involving
mutual reciprocity. 04
After establishing reciprocity agreements as within the purview
of section 1, the court considered the Government's contract alle-
gations by examining the transactions between Liquid Carbonic-
General Dynamics and six compaines with which the court believed
the practice of reciprocity to be "most evident."'0 5 The court con-
strued section 1 as applicable only to those contracts which reflected
a direct causal relation between the contract and the reciprocity
program. Thus, only contracts based on proven agreements to
reciprocate or expressly stated to have been procured through
11" See notes 61-71 supra and accompanying text. For an economic analysis of
reciprocity intended to show that in some forms it does not lessen but may in fact
enhance competition, see Ferguson, supra note 94.
2o' See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
102 258 F. Supp. at 66. Handler, Eighteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Develop-
ments, 20 REcoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 540, 554-56 (1965).
10 "[W]here the buyer is free to take either product by itself there is no tying
problem even though the seller may also offer the two items as a unit at a single
price." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 nA (1958). The Supreme
Court further illustrated that the tying rule is founded on the use of leverage by the
following statement: "Of course where the seller has no control or dominance over
the tying product so that it does not represent an effectual weapon to pressure buyers
into taking the tied item any restraint of trade ... would ... be insignificant ......
id. at 6. "Mhe vice of tying arrangements lies in the use of economic power in one
market to restrict competition ... in another ...." Id. at 11.
1oSee Burrus, supra note 94, at 588; Ferguson, supra note 94, at 570-80; Handler,
Gilding the Philosophic Pill-Trading Bows. for Arrows, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 1, 6-8
(1966); Note, 1 VALPARAIso L. RaV. 114 (1966); cf. White Motor Co. v. United States,
372 U.S. 253, 261-63 (1963).
1 258 F. Supp. at 51-56.
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reciprocity were held to be within section 1.106 All other contracts
were rejected, even though the court found that the company in-
volved had been successfully subjected to coercive reciprocity.10 7
Insistence upon a high degree of causal connection between the
reciprocity program and contracts arising out of it places a heavy
burden of proof on the enforcement agency'08 while leaving a sub-
stantial loophole for the clever and cautious practitioner of reci-
procity. Arguably, such a stringent standard is unnecessary, for
agreement may be inferred from the conduct of the parties.10 9 In
light of a systematically applied and successful program of reciprocity,
it seems unnecessary to require that agreements to reciprocate be
based solely upon written contracts or express agreements." 0 If
21a Thus, a contract with Standard Oil "attributable to an agreement . . . calling
for each company to purchase certain products from the other" qualified for the § 1
proscription, id. at 54, as did a sale of 420,000 lbs. of carbon dioxide to Shell Oil
based on a statement made by an officer of General Dynamics that the sale had been
procured by reciprocity. Id. at 55.
207 It was established that coercive reciprocity was imposed upon Raytheon and that
contracts with that company had been vigorously and successfully pursued. Neverthe-
less, no contracts arising between Liquid Carbonic-General Dynamics and Raytheon
were subjected to the proscription of § 1, because individual contracts did not expressly
reflect a reciprocity basis. Id. at 53-54.
201 The reality of the Government's burden where it is dear that reciprocity has
produced sales far beyond those ascribable to specific contracts is demonstrated in the
instant case. The district court found that reciprocity, systematically applied through
the Special Sales Program, had resulted in 1,085,066 dollars of carbon dioxide sales.
Id. at 49. Nevertheless, the court conservatively concluded that less than twenty per cent
of that figure resulted from contracts procured by reciprocity, and ultimately determined
that a total of two contracts were directly the result of reciprocity. See note 106 supra.
On the other hand, Transitron was "engaged in a 'mutual patronage' arrangement" but
no "particular contracts" were shown, 258 F. Supp. at 52; in the case of Raytheon,
it was "proven that leverage was applied by the defendant," ibid., but "no all em-
bracing agreement" was shown. Id. at 54.
209 United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); see United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948); Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208,
226-27 (1939). "A tying arrangement ... 'need not be expressly embodied in written
contracts. Such arrangements may be deduced from a course of conduct."' Associated
Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753, 765-66 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
820 (1965). Accord, Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832, 837 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961); Arr'y GEN. REP. 30; Rahl, Conspiracy and the Antitrust
Laws, 44 Ir.L. L. REv. 743, 744-48 (1949).
"""See Harvith, Reciprocity and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 40 WASH. L. REv. 133,
154-55 (1965). In fact, the district court, in its opinion denying the motion to dis-
miss, seemingly adopted the view that specific agreements to reciprocate were not
required: "The dear inference to be drawn is that [resulting] sales agreements . . .
contained implied reciprocity considerations. These agreements which emerged from
a course of conduct clearly declared anticompetitive are suspect themselves because
of the circumstances which surround them, although no express condition is evident
on the fact of the agreements .... The defendant has systematically injected recip-
rocal dealing into its sales negotiations. Thus the agreements which are the product
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produced by the reciprocity program, even a simple contract between
buyer and seller could validly be held sufficient to satisfy the sec-
tion 1 requirement."' By refusing so to infer, the court markedly
limited the effective scope of section 1.
Moreover, the court rigidly applied a second requirement to
determine whether particular contracts were proscribed, namely,
that each contract be represented by a specific dollar value.1 2 This
standard, based upon the notion that the amount of commerce
affected by the contracts must explicitly be shown,"13 further reduced
the efficacy of the Government's evidence.1 4  In fact, such a re-
quirement has not been uniformly imposed in the tying cases."5
Thus its use in the instant situation does not seem to comport fully
with the tie-in analogy and furthermore restricts within narrow
bounds the manner in which a section 1 violation may be established.
Ultimately, the district court concluded that the amount of com-
merce represented by the contracts meeting the imposed require-
ments was insufficient to be termed "not insubstantial""8 and there-
of this anticompetitive practice ... are in restraint of trade ...." 246 F. Supp. 156,
167 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The same approach could easily have been followed in the
final decision, and no clear reason for the change in emphasis is apparent from the
opinion. See 258 F. Supp. at 51-56; Austin, A Survey of the Problems Encountered
in Combating Reciprocal Trading Under Existing Trade Regulation Laws, 41 IND. L.J.
165, 193-95 (1966).
I" The proscription of § 1 in terms reaches every contract which unduly restrains
trade. Thus, "a contract between buyer and seller ... is enough to satisfy the joint
conduct requirement of Section 1 of the Sherman Act." Albert H. Cayne Equip. Corp.
v. Union Asbestos & Rubber Co., 220 F. Supp. 784, 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
112 "[F]or the practice to be unlawful however, a not insubstantial amount of trade
must be foreclosed .... [N]o dollar amounts .. . could be ascribed to the unlawful
agreements. This being the case, ,the government has failed to prove that the relation-
ship ...was violative of Section 1 .... ." 258 F. Supp. at 52.
1 1 See id. at 52-56, 66; note 112 supra. Compare notes 96-100 supra.11
1 For example, the purchases from Liquid Carbonic by one of General Dynamics'
vendors, Transitron, multiplied more than fourteen times between 1960 and 1962, and
the court found a mutual reciprocity arrangement to be in effect. Nevertheless, these
transactions were dismissed because no dollar amounts could be ascribed to the agree-
ments. See 258 F. Supp. at 52.
115 See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (partially dollar value
and partially inference from the volume of trade); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (substantiality assumed from the amount of commerce in-
volved, without quantitative definition); Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d
753 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 820 (1965) (same).
.16 Comparing the total value of the contracts meeting the court's criteria, 177,225
dollars, to the 500,000 dollars found "not insubstantial" in International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), the court concluded: "[That] is the lowest figure so
designated by the court to date, in situations analogous to the present case. Since the
government has proven the other prong of the Sherman § 1 case, viz., that the merger
itself is violative of the statute, this aspect of the case is an inappropriate vehicle for
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fore that the Government had failed to prove the section 1 viola-
tion. 11 7  By construing section 1 to require a strict causal relation
and specific dollar value, the court promulgated a proscription which
seems inadequate to prevent all but the most extensively documented
reciprocity programs. Alternatively, the court might have accepted
the Government's contention that agreements restraining trade
should be inferred from transactions arising within the scope of a
pervasive and broadly applied reciprocity program." 8  However, by
fully accepting this approach the court might have been understood
to imply the illegality of any contract which the acquired company
entered into with a supplier of the acquiring company where reci-
procity is "in the air." Seemingly unwilling to apply the proscrip-
tion of section 1 so broadly, the court chose the more demanding but
more clearly delineated analysis with its consequent restricted and
easily avoidable prohibitory effect.
However, since "both parties had the intent, at the time of the
merger, to employ the anti-competitive device of reciprocity" and a
"not insubstantial amount of commerce was affected as a result," the
court held that the merger itself was in violation of section 1." 9
Although the court engaged in little discussion or analysis, cursory
treatment seems justifiable on the ground that the decision comports
with substantial authority. 20
The district court's broad theoretical proscription of reciprocity
under section 1 involves the application of the rules concerning
finding an amount considerably less than $500,000 as 'not insubstantial."' 258 F. Supp.
at 67.
217 Ibid.
118 The Government argued as follows: "[W]here a practice is engaged in which has
such a pernicious effect on competition and is without redeeming virtue, it will be
held illegal '. . . without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm . .. caused or
business excuse for [its] use.' Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958). It is settled law that where a course of conduct is pernicious and illegal,
agreements growing out of it are themselves illegal because of the surrounding cir-
cumstances, even though nothing illegal appears on their face. American Tobacco Co.
v. United States, 147 F.2d 93, 107 (6th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United
States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99 (1920); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U.S. 375, 396 (1905)." Government's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Mo-
tion to Dismiss, pp. 18-19, United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 246 F. Supp. 156
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). The district court seemingly accepted the Government's contention in
its opinion denying the motion to dismiss. See note 110 supra.
119 258 F. Supp. at 67.
120 E.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 523-25 (1948) (dictum);
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 104-06 (1948). See United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
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tying arrangements to both mutual and coercive reciprocity and thus
provides an important addition to the weapons which may be used
to combat these practices. 121 However, after promulgating its broad
formula, the court then proceeded to interpret it so strictly as to
greatly negate its practical effect. Nevertheless, the scope of much
of the court's language is not restricted to the case at hand and stands
as an ominous and uncertain portent for the future of reciprocal
dealing and the companies which practice it.
CONCLUSION
The result reached in General Dynamics is eminently justifiable.
There can be little doubt that General Dynamics engaged in recip-
rocal arrangements which affected competition in a manner that
cannot be condoned. As we have seen,' 22 however, the language
utilized by the court in reaching its decision seemingly goes beyond
121 The immediate effect of the court's decision is to broaden the antitrust coverage
of reciprocity, but it seems likely that § 7 will continue as the primary weapon to
combat offensive mergers because of the less stringent burden of proof which that
provision imposes. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,
609-10 (1953). Section 7 requires that only a probability that competition will be lessened
be proved while § 1 demands proof of actualities. See note 24 supra; Arr'Y GEN. REP.
115-18 8- n.l. Section 1 also requires proof of an agreement or conduct from which
agreement may be inferred. See note 109 supra and accompanying text. Where no
reciprocity agreement or intent can be proved, § 7 provides the remedy. In any event,
the less demanding standards of § 7 are likely to be preferred although no bar prevents
the further use of § 1 where the facts indicate that its invocation would be appropriate.
It is doubtful, however, that reciprocity litigation will be confined to §§ 1 and 7.
Other antitrust provisions may provide remedies both in merger and non-merger
contexts. These alternative procedures include:
(1) Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which provides that "unfair
methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1964). Section 5 provides a way in which to avoid the agreement requirements of
§ 1, as stated by Mr. Donald Turner: "That particular problem of the courts, the
necessity of finding agreement, is not present where the [FTC) ... proceeds under Sec-
tion 5 .... It seems to me that this is . . . the easiest vehicle for attacking ... reci-
procity." Interview with the Honorable Donald F. Turner, 30 A.B.A. ANrrTRusr SEC-
TION 100, 114 (1966). See Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931); Austin, supra note
110, at 186-92;
(2) The provisions against monopoly, attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to
monopolize under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1964). A reciprocity suit is presently pending against General Motors under this
provision, United States v. General Motors Corp., TRADE REG. Ra'. 45,063 (Case 1733)
(N.D. Ill. 1963). See Phillips, Reciprocity Under the Antitrust Laws: Observations On
the Hales' Comment, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 77, 79 (1964);
(3) The price discrimination provisions of §2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730
(1914), as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (a) (1964). See Harvith, supra note 110, at 159-64.
122 See notes 60-67, 99-104 supra and accompanying text.
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the bounds of necessity to impose rigid and inflexible proscriptions
of practices which are not equally absolute in effect. In this light,
it would seem advisable to reappraise the phenomenon of reciprocity
and more judiciously apply the available sanctions to avoid a
reciprocity policy which may be "repugnant to common sense, hu-
man nature and business reality."12 3
123 Handler, Gilding the Philosophic Pill-Trading Bows for Arrows, 66 COLUM. L.
REv. 1, 11 (1966).
